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ARTICLES
DEBATABLE PREMISES IN TELECOM
POLICY
JUSTIN (GUS) HURWITZ & ROSLYN LAYTON*
INTRODUCTION
Around the world, telecommunications policy is one of the most
important areas of public policy. The modern economy is driven by telecom technologies, and many telecom-related firms – Google, Apple, Facebook, and myriad fixed and mobile Internet service providers – are
among the largest companies in the world. The Internet is opening up
new platforms for business, education, government, and civic engagement. It has literally been a driving force in toppling governments. Telecommunications policy is important to every government in the world,
and debates over what policies should be implemented are heated in
almost every country in the world.
Unfortunately, many of the arguments used in these debates – especially those supporting regulatory intervention – rest on faulty premises. These premises often follow from ideas that make intuitive sense –
and that have great political valence – but that don‟t stand up well to
critical analysis. This paper collects and responds to a number of these
*
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premises that, collectively, underlie much popular, political, and academic support for increased telecommunications regulation in the United States and Europe – as well as much of the rest of the world.
The primary purpose of presenting these arguments in this form is
to focus attention on the nature of telecommunications policy debates
and the role of telecommunications research in these debates. The critiques offered in this paper are, at some level, meant to challenge the
validity of these premises. Their primary goal however, is more modest:
to demonstrate that these premises are debatable. Too often they are
assumed to be true or are simply presented as fact. One of this paper‟s
own premises is that a core function of telecommunications research
should be to add nuance and sophistication to policy discussions – not to
further entrench already ossified positions.
On the other hand, it does not require great introspection to recognize that this is a field in which the line between scholarship and research on the one hand and advocacy, policy, and the press on the other
is blurry and at times permeable. This is driven largely by the social
and political role that communications infrastructure plays in modern
democratic societies, both as a tool for communications and as a symbol
of freedom, equality, and related values – these are the concerns that
drive most popular and policy interest in these topics, as well as much
scholarship. At the same time, these issues can be looked at from more
technocratic perspectives, focusing on the underlying economics, technologies, demographic and usage patterns, and similar factors. It is frequently the case that these different approaches to the same questions
lead to divergent policy proposals. Even when they could lead to convergent policy outcomes, the different approaches to issues may lead to divergent viewpoints in the discussions.
The broadest goal of this paper, in some ways modest, in others
ambitious, is to shed light on how those involved in telecom policy discuss these issues and to encourage us to think about the role of scholarship and research in policy and popular telecommunications debates.
More narrowly, the goal is to demonstrate that important ideas in
these debates require greater nuance than they are ordinarily afforded.
In some cases, this lack of nuance yields a false dichotomy, such that
consumers (it may be asserted) either need or do not need a given service; in some cases it results from incorrect technical understandings or
overly-simplified models; and in other cases it results because the ideas
that we debate are really implicit proxies for other political or policy
views. In any of these cases, however, the result is that participants in
telecom policy debates often talk past each other and adopt entrenched,
self-reinforcing, positions.
The five premises that this paper considers are:
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1. Everyone needs low-cost access to high speed broadband service
2. High-speed broadband is necessary for education, health, government, and other social services
3. Wireless can‟t compete with cable
4. An open Internet is necessary for innovation and necessarily
benefits consumers
5. Telecommunications are better somewhere else.
Debates over telecom policy are necessary to the wellbeing and
prosperity of citizens around the world. Sound telecom policy can benefit consumers in every nation; bad ideas can be terribly costly to them.
At its best, telecom policy can help lift the poorest and least fortunate
among us to prosperity, afford unparalleled access to education, health,
and other essential services, and create platforms for expression and
enterprise unknown at any prior point in human history. Few, if any,
other technologies or industries have the potential to create so much
good for so many.
As a result, these arguments tap into deep currents in the popular
psyche. The questions at issue in telecommunications policy reflect values at the core of democratic societies, social commitments to equality
and universal access, and concern over censorship and centralized control of information. The intuitive appeal of these arguments ensures
that they find substantial support among well-intentioned legislators,
regulators, and much of the public. However, intuitive appeal often
leads analysis astray. This paper relies primarily on economic and
technical analysis and research to demonstrate that the intuitive approach to these issues often leads to conclusions deleterious to consumers.
That the consumer must come first is a central theme that runs
throughout this analysis, and should be a guiding principle through all
telecom policy debates. It is too often the case that even wellintentioned and seemingly consumer-friendly policies do not fully appreciate the complexity of the market and therefore fail to place the interest of all consumers ahead of the interests of specific, often narrow,
interest groups.
Hopefully, identifying faults in these premises will help us to address the issues that they represent with greater care; and hopefully
this paper‟s presentation will foster discussion about the role of economically- and technically-informed research in policy debates. This is an
exciting time in telecom policy. It is also a challenging time, given the
fundamental shifts in technology and the industry that have occurred in
recent decades.
This paper proceeds in six parts. Each of the first five parts corresponds to one of the premises listed above. Part six discusses themes
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that run through several of these premises and considers the role of
substantive telecommunications research in telecommunications policy
debates.

I. PREMISE ONE: EVERYONE NEEDS LOW-COST ACCESS TO
HIGH-SPEED BROADBAND
The first premise we consider is that everyone needs low-cost access
to high-speed broadband. This idea is central to contemporary debates
in the telecom space and guides much of current policy. This premise
gives rise to several related policy prescriptions: ensuring the availability of service everywhere (universal service); ensuring that service is either low-cost or subsidized for those who may not be able to afford access; ensuring that at least one carrier offering such service is available
to every consumer (a “carrier of last resort”); and imposing various service-level guarantees and quality of service requirements on every carrier.
As an initial matter, universal telephone service has historically
been leveraged to support various important social commitments. Ensuring that everyone has access to some basic communications platform, so that they are able to get access to emergency services and avail
themselves of other important government and social programs is an
important value that we should strive to maintain. As will be repeated
several times in this paper, the consumer must come first – it is unquestionably the case that there is a set of basic services that we should
ensure are available to all consumers.1
The challenging questions are at what level and by what means do
we maintain these commitments. Many in the telecom policy space – often those with the loudest voices – have long advocated that every
American needs access to high-performance telecommunications services (today, that is high-speed Internet service) at low cost. 2 Indeed, a
majority of what the FCC does today is done with this goal, directly or
indirectly, in mind.3 But while there is a strong argument that we
should endeavor to provide every American with access to some level of
connectivity, it is unclear what that level of connectivity should be. Indeed, as we have transitioned from narrowband voice communications
to broadband Internet connectivity, the advocates and policy makers
1. See, e.g., Tom Wheeler, Chairman, Fed. Comm. Comm‟n, Remarks at Ohio State
University (Dec. 2, 2013), available at http://www.fcc.gov/document/remarks-fccchairman-tom-wheeler-ohio-state-university (discussing the “Network Compact”).
2. See, e.g., SUSAN CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE AUDIENCE: THE TELECOM INDUSTRY AND
MONOPOLY POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (Yale University Press, 2012).
3. Wheeler, supra note 1.
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have consistently increased their target for sufficient levels of connectivity. This is most recently seen in the FCC‟s re-definition of “broadband” Internet as service of at least 25 mbps – a level of service sufficient to simultaneously stream four High Definition video streams. 4
Importantly, these changes have tracked changes in median (or even
high-end) usage patterns, as opposed to tracking what is sufficient to
provision socially necessary services: the resources required to watch
multiple High Definition video streams are orders of magnitude greater
than what is required to use the Internet to access the range of services
needed to support basic social and political services.
Historically, the difficulty of determining what services belong in
this set has been masked by the nature of telephone technology. The
basic unit of connection – the twisted pair of copper wires – that was
necessary for any service was also sufficient for most services of interest
to most consumers. As a result, by requiring universal provision of the
most basic services, we also facilitated the provision of more advanced
services.
This no longer holds in today‟s digital economy. One can get connected to the communications network through various means: fiber,
coaxial cable, wireless voice, fixed and mobile wireless data, satellite,
and even still, the good old twisted pairs of copper wire. Each of these
means of connecting to the network offers better or worse support for
various services and applications. Fiber is very fast but expensive; cable
and (especially) DSL are somewhat slower, but are also somewhat
cheaper; wireless is generally a bit slower still (at least as of today), a
bit less reliable and often somewhat more expensive than cable – but
it‟s mobile, which is pretty great! Some of these technologies are better
for voice service, for video service, for downloading large amounts of data, or for playing video games. Some of these services are also better or
worse regarding our social commitments: mobile wireless, for instance,
is great in that you can bring your connection to emergency services
wherever you go; but it is problematic that it can be difficult for those
emergency services to know your location should you need them to find
you.5
Developments in the many technologies suggest that we need to
take a more nuanced view of how to provision communications net4. See 2015 Broadband Progress Report and Notice of Inquiry, In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such
Deployment, No. 14-126, FED. COMM. COMM‟N (Jan 29, 2015), available at
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-15-10A1.pdf.
5. See, e.g., Fourth Report and Order, In the Matter of Wireless E911 Location Accuracy Requirements, No. 07-114, FED. COMM. COMM‟N (Jan. 29, 2015), available at
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2015/db0310/FCC-15-9A1.pdf.
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works to support important social commitments. The historical precedent, that we would provision a connection capable of supporting nearly
the full range of possible services, was a happy historical accident. It
was possible in part because the basic unit of service was capable of
supporting the full range of consumer-oriented communications services. And it was possible in part because the relative elasticity of demand for communications services offered a relatively efficient mechanism for funding universal service buildout.6
The most difficult aspect of this more nuanced view is that we need
to think seriously about what services are included in the bundle of
basic social commitments.7 Many advocates argue that every American
should have access to low-cost Internet service capable of supporting
streaming video services. That is quite an upgrade from the basic services historically provided through universal service – basic local voice
communications service (long distance was available, but at substantial
cost). Many advocates justify promoting this class of Internet service as
“basic” on the grounds that such high-speed service is needed to ensure
access to, for example, educational, health care, and governmental services. However, the reality is that most (and possibly all) of the services
that clearly belong in the bundle of basic commitments – affordable access to a reliable communications platform that provides access to
emergency services, essential government services and information,
employment applications, and even basic e-commerce – do not require a
class of service sufficient to support high quality streaming video. Those
who think that other, more resource-intensive services do belong in the
bundle should face a stiff burden in advancing their argument.
Rather than drafting a new regulatory requirement, the FCC could
encourage that the services people consume (particularly video, which
6. This is because universal service has traditionally been supported by a crosssubsidy from relatively inelastic-demand services (such as business-oriented calling
plans) to relatively elastic-demand services, like local calling. This is an example of Ramsey pricing. See F.P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 Econ. J. 47, 5859 (1927).
7. This theme, developed further in this Part, comes up frequently in discussions
about universal service. Historically, the range of communications services was relatively
limited and almost entirely voice-oriented; as such nearly all communications services
could be provided over a connection sufficient to provide any communications service. In
other words, if the telephone company could run a pair of copper wires to a customer‟s
premises, that pair of wires would be sufficient to provide the full range of services that
the telephone company offers. This meant that we had the luxury of not differentiating
between the social value – and therefore the necessity of ensuring access to – different
services, because any consumer who could get access to any services could get access to all
services, this is not the case in the Internet era. The characteristics of a given Internet
connection affect the services that can function over that connection. As such, today we
need to think about the qualitative aspects of an Internet connection – what services that
connection can support – not just whether there is a connection.

2015]

DEBATABLE PREMISES IN TELECOM POLICY

459

takes up over half of America‟s network peak capacity) 8 make more efficient use of bandwidth. Improved content encoding and video compression can save 30-50% of bandwidth, not to mention drive cost reductions
for content and video providers.9 As explained in a report commissioned
by Ofcom, the bit rate required to achieve the same audio and video
quality is halved every five years – a Moore‟s Law for bandwidth efficiency.10 This means that today‟s networks will continue to deliver more
data as innovation enables ever-increasing levels of throughput.
Indeed, the idea that high-speed broadband is necessary in order to
meet these social commitments, and also to provide various educational,
healthcare, government and other services, implicitly excludes various
disadvantaged communities from these services. 11 The only reason that
high-speed broadband is necessary for many of these services is because
they have been developed to offer rich multi-media experiences. That is,
they use audio and video. This means that service often are not accessible to the deaf or blind. In our race to leverage the latest and greatest
technologies for various (legitimately important) services, we too often
forget that not everyone can avail themselves of those technologies.
Perhaps the most tragic aspect of this premise is that it is largely
needless: there is little reason for many of the services being deployed
online to require rich multi-media. The push for a resource-intensive
user experience is in many cases driven by the existence of the technology, not by the needs of the users. This, in turn, drives up consumer
need to high-speed broadband.12
A better, more modest, regulatory initiative may be to require essential services – the sort of applications that would justify ensuring access to broadband – to be developed so as to not require high-speed
broadband. Rather than fueling a race to use more bandwidth-intensive
design practices, the government could instead lead the way in the
adoption of more efficient, resource-conscious, design practices. This
8. See SANDVINE, GLOBAL INTERNET PHENOMENA REPORT 2H 2014, at 5 (Fall
2014),
available
at
https://www.sandvine.com/downloads/general/global-internetphenomena/2014/2h-2014-global-internet-phenomena-report.pdf.
9. Roslyn Layton, FCC and Verizon: There is a technical solution, FORBES (Aug. 6,
2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/roslynlayton/2014/08/06/fcc-and-verizon-there-is-atechnical-solution/.
10. KEN MCCANN & ADRIANNA MATTEI, TECHNICAL EVOLUTION OF THE DTT
PLATFORM, ZETACAST 18-19 (Jan. 28, 2012), available at http://www.zetacast.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/Evolution-of-DTT.pdf.
11. See infra, Part II.
12. One may think of this as a form of Baumol‟s Cost Disease, in which bandwidth
consumption (instead of salaries) increases across the board in response to increased
bandwidth consumption by a small number of in-demand applications. See generally
WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WILLIAM G. BOWEN, PERFORMING ARTS, THE ECONOMIC DILEMMA:
A STUDY OF PROBLEMS COMMON TO THEATER, OPERA, MUSIC, AND DANCE (1966).
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would serve the parallel goals of improving accessibility and decreasing
reliance on high-speed broadband.
There is a more fundamental point underlying this idea: engineers
optimize – that is they design products around – the simplest and least
costly constraints. This means, for example, that if bandwidth is cheap
and plentiful, programmers will design applications that make use of
that bandwidth. If, on the other hand, bandwidth it costly, programmers will design applications that make less use of data – and consumers will demand such applications. Indeed, we see examples of this in
the mobile space, in which engineers design applications to minimize
bandwidth requirements because mobile bandwidth is relatively expensive. For example as more users access Facebook with mobile devices,
Facebook re-engineered its mobile platform, decreasing average monthly data use from 14MB/mo to 2MB/mo.13 Not only does this lower long
term operating costs for Facebook, the lowered data requirement of the
platform encourages users to access it more. Or consider recent research that computer users on metered Internet connections are more
concerned about viruses and other harmful programs – thus they expend more resources to keep their computers free of such software to
keep their monthly Internet bills lower.
And consider that in environments where bandwidth is scare, for
example India, Pakistan, and parts of Africa, engineers and entrepreneurs conceive applications from the beginning as needing to function
within strict bandwidth constraints. Due to the limited bandwidth
available in these regions, video conferencing and streaming video applications need to be delivered on less than 1 mbps connections, so they
design technologies that make more efficient use of bandwidth than do
engineers in economies where bandwidth is cheaper and greater. 14
Recent telecommunications policy discussions have increasingly
embraced ideas of dynamic competition and innovation. In the context
of network neutrality, for instance, the FCC has made use of the idea
that there is a “virtuous cycle,” where openness today drives innovation
in application development, which in turn will drive increased consumer demand for broadband.15 But this cycle need not be “virtuous.” If we
13. See Isaac Munyampama, Mark Zuckerberg at Mobile World Congress 2014 (Full
Video), YOUTUBE (Feb. 24, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VHwkHZpXqWc (at
minute 28:20).
14. See N. Narendra et al., MobiCoStream: Real-Time Collaborative Video Upstream
for Mobile Augmented Reality Applications, IEEE INT‟L CONF. ON ADVANCED NETWORKS &
TELECOMM. SYS. 6 (Dec. 14, 2014); D. Chattopadhyay et al., Adaptive Rate Control for
H.264 Based Video Conferencing over a Low Bandwidth Wired and Wireless Channel,
IEEE INT‟L SYMP. ON BROADBAND MUTLIMEDIA SYS. & BROADCASTING 6 (May 13, 2009).
15. See Report and Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order, In the Matter
of Protecting and Preserving the Open Internet, No. 14-28, FED. COMM. COMM‟N 2 (Feb.
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peg required bandwidth floors to a level sufficient to accommodate the
most bandwidth intensive applications, this will tend to increase the
bandwidth consumed by all applications by virtue of removing bandwidth as a constraint – this, in turn, will increase the amount of bandwidth that needs to be offered. The resulting incentive structure unravels, creating a constant upward pressure. A policy that implements such
an incentive structure has the perverse effect of supporting – even incentivizing – lazy innovation and poor design practices.
A critical question – the most important one – about these services
is often overlooked: where is the consumer in all of this? Those advocating high-speed broadband as a universal service often have more to gain
from such programs than the median consumer. Firms such as Google,
that provide services and applications that run over communications
infrastructure, are clear beneficiaries; as are networking equipment
manufacturers. Politicians, too, often have much to gain from this
strategy, as the costs of provisioning these networks are not transparent to voters and indirectly bourn. Also, the academy is more likely to
reward academics who promote regulatory programs that appear to advance social needs than those who argue against programs that appear
to benefit the public interest.
However, just as communications technologies and the services
that they facilitate are diverse, so too are consumer preferences. It is
absolutely the case that there are basic services to which we should do
our best to ensure that everyone has reasonable access. Though today
we need to think more carefully about what these services are than we
have historically needed. Most importantly still, we should resist the
urge to treat every consumer as though he or she has the same needs
and wants as Washington, DC, Silicon Valley, and academic policy
makers.
Along these lines, the meaning of “universal service” is long past a
need for review. Returning to the earlier discussion of how the basic
unit of transmission has changed – from a unit capable of supporting
the full range of telecommunications services to a range of units capable
of supporting a range of services – the central question that “universal
service” faces is what services need to be universal. There is a strong
argument, for instance, that the basic service universally available
should be sufficient to support access to basic news and information,
health, educational, and governmental services. There may be some argument that such a connection should be capable of supporting basic
online video services. But there is only a weak argument that highdefinition, or even 4K, online video needs to be universally available.
26, 2015), http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2015/db0312/FCC-1524A1.pdf.
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It may make sense, for instance, to reframe universal service goals
to focus on enabling certain classes of applications. Rather than define
universal service as generic high-speed Internet (itself defined as, e.g.,
“25 mbps down/3 mbps up” service16), universal service could be defined
as service sufficient to support a minimum bundle of services. That
bundle may include, for instance, healthcare, education, employment,
and government services; common news and information services; basic
online video services; and VoIP and other common over-the-top services.
There are two basic challenges to such an approach. The obvious
challenge is defining what services should be included in this basic
bundle – though this is the sort of task routinely overseen by regulators.
A more subtle and potentially difficult challenge is that it may create an
incentive for application designers to make excessive use of bandwidth.
This incentive may exist because access providers would be required to
provide a bundle of services sufficient to support those applications, no
matter how inefficiently designed they may be. This approach to defining universal service, therefore, would need to be careful to take this into consideration. It may, for instance, be possible to competitively
benchmark the bandwidth (and other) requirements of like-services in
determining whether an access provider is sufficiently provisioning its
network.
More generally, the Commission may want to encourage similar
experimentation with how Internet services are marketed and sold. Few
consumers have an appreciable understanding of the difference between
6 mbps and 25 mbps service, or of the difference between the resources
required to deliver an e-mail as compared to a 60-minute streaming
video. The norm of marketing Internet access in terms of peak download and upload capacity is confusing to consumers, ignores the possibility of service commitments and competition along other metrics (e.g.,
latency or jitter), and is generally irrelevant to what consumers care
about.
It would almost certainly be more relevant and less confusing to
consumers if Internet access was marketed in terms of the services it
supports. Perhaps even more important, such marketing would likely
provide consumers with more meaningful remedies should access providers fail to live up to these promises. An express commitment that a
given service package is capable of supporting HD streaming video, for
16. See 2015 Broadband Progress Report and Notice of Inquiry, In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such
Deployment, No. 14-126, FED. COMM. COMM‟N (Jan 29, 2015), available at
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-15-10A1.pdf (“we find that, having
“advanced telecommunications capability” requires access to actual download speeds of at
least 25 Mbps and actual upload speeds of at least 3 Mbps (25 Mbps/3 Mbps).”).
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instance, would more likely create an enforceable contractual commitment than the current approach to marketing; it would make enforcement actions by the FCC or FTC easier to bring and more likely to be
successful; and it would require Internet access providers to upgrade
their infrastructure to match changing requirements of various services. Anathema to the views of many policy advocates – those, for instance, who would view this idea as turning Internet access into a “cable-like” system – it could be among the most consumer-friendly of
possible changes to how Internet services are marketed and provided.17
A final possible innovation to universal service would be to allow
localities to “buy out” of the system. While universal service, as defined
by the FCC, may be an important federal goal, local municipalities may
face other priorities, or have other ideas about how to best achieve the
universal service goals. Just as we should recognize consumer welfare
and preferences should be the loadstone of telecommunications policy,
we should recognize that municipal governments may have a better
sense of the wants and needs of a local population than the federal government. It may therefore be reasonable to allow local governments to
“buy out” of federally-administered universal service programs by accepting a one-time payment of some amount less than that which would
be invested in the locality through the federal program.
II. PREMISE TWO: HIGH-SPEED BROADBAND IS NECESSARY
FOR EDUCATION, HEALTH, GOVERNMENT, AND OTHER SOCIAL
SERVICES
The idea that high-speed broadband is necessary for education,
healthcare, and other social and government services, is related to the
first premise. This premise is problematic both because it is factually
dubious, and also because its power is based in an implicit appeal to inherently emotional issues. It creates a sense that the only way to support high-quality education, provide access to healthcare and employment opportunities, and address concerns about the digital divide is to
support a specific broadband policy – namely one of extensive government subsidies for high-speed broadband. As recognized in the previous
section, broadband Internet service and other communications technologies support many important services that should be viewed as basic
social commitments – but the focus in telecom policy debates should be
on ensuring Internet access that is sufficient to realize these basic social
commitments, not on subsidizing higher-speed luxury services or services that the market would otherwise provide at competitive prices.
The first, most important response to this premise is that high17. See, e.g., The Team Behind John Wooley, INTERNET MUST GO, available at
http://www.theinternetmustgo.com/about/ (last visited June 1, 2015).
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speed broadband connectivity isn‟t typically needed for education,
healthcare, or other social services. It is especially true that the bandwidth sufficient for high-quality video streaming services – a critical
benchmark for broadband advocates and the FCC18 – isn‟t necessary for
these services. For example, today‟s system requirements for video conferencing applications, including programs routinely used for distance
education and MOOCs (“Massive Online Open Courses”), is in the 1-2
mbps range.
The developers of these applications recognize that their products
need to work even in low bandwidth environments, so they design their
applications to function even without high-speed broadband. Adobe
Connect, for instance, only requires 512 kbps connection for classroom
participants. Coursera, a popular MOOC platform developed by Stanford, Princeton, the University of Michigan, and the University of Pennsylvania and today comprises a consortium of over 100 universities, has
a mobile-optimized app that allows students to view recorded class sessions on their mobile devices. Similarly, Adobe Connect has a mobile
application that allows for real-time video participation.
More bandwidth is of course preferable, but typically is not required for basic operation. In technical terms, it is important to recognize that most of the video delivered in the MOOC setting is highly
compressible. Unlike television or movie content, most of the frame is
generally static, with relatively simple background settings. Such video
is readily and substantially compressible. Moreover, because MOOC
software needs to support the typical student‟s computer hardware (e.g.,
a moderate resolution monitor displaying both in-class video and other
class-related materials on a single screen), the typical resolution of video in the online teaching environment will be far below that of HD
streaming video services.19 Additionally, and perhaps counterintuitively, MOOCs with their large enrollments generally require less bandwidth than smaller online teaching settings. The large class sizes mean
that most video will be delivered one way, from the instructor to the
students – due to the large number of students, interactivity will be
achieved through non-video means (such as quizzes or written questions
moderated by an in-class assistant). In such a setting, the user experi18. See, e.g., 2015 Broadband Progress Report, No. 14-126, FED. COMM. COMM‟N
(listing video as the first “common application” requiring redefinition of broadband Internet service to require 25 mbps speeds).
19. See also Arnold Kling, Many-to-One vs. One-to-Many: An Opinionated Guide to
Educational
Technology,
AM.
ENTER.
INST.
(Sept.
12.
2012),
http://www.aei.org/publication/many-to-one-vs-one-to-many-an-opinionated-guide-toeducational-technology/ (arguing that the more fundamental change to education enabled
to technology is many-to-one teaching through adaptive textbooks, rather than the massive one-to-many model of teaching facilitate by MOOCs).
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ence will be less sensitive both to bandwidth and latency variations.
This reveals another often overlooked aspect of broadband policy
debates: bandwidth isn‟t the only and often isn‟t the most important,
metric. Latency (the time it takes a packet of data to traverse the network), jitter (the chance in latency between packets), and packet loss
(the percentage of packets of data that never make it across the network) are incredibly important metrics, especially for applications in
education and health care – applications where the user may need to
interact in real time with a teacher, classmates, or healthcare professional. Substantial or irregular latency and packet loss can lead to
jumpy, broken, or lost audio and video – it is preferable to have a lower
resolution with consistent-quality audio and video than high-quality
with unreliable audio and video.
The idea that latency and packet loss can be as important as bandwidth is not new, but it is one that plays little role in contemporary policy debates. The failure to appreciate the importance of these metrics is
a serious flaw in these policy discussions. It is akin to having a transportation policy that focuses on miles of highway constructed but pays
no attention to whether those highways actually decrease commute
times or accidents.20
Indeed, where education, healthcare, or other services require highperformance Internet service, one important alternative to provisioning
high-speed Internet service in high-cost areas is to rely instead on quality of service (QoS) and prioritization techniques to ensure sufficient
performance over lower-speed links. This would not allow a service requiring an average 2 mbps throughput to operate over a 1 mbps link –
but, where such a service may not function well on even a 3-4 mbps
connection, prioritization could allow it to operate satisfactorily over a
lower-speed (e.g., 2 mbps) link. To make sure this paragraph‟s suggestion is clear: lower-speed links that do not adhere to “network neutral”
routing may often be able to support the same services that would require a higher-speed (and higher-cost) connection on a neutral network.
Another important, and often overlooked, metric is adoption. In recent years survey evidence, such as the Pew Research Center‟s study on
Internet and American Life,21 has made clear that availability and price
20. See, e.g., Steinberg & Zangwill, The Prevalence of Braess‟s Paradox, 17 TRANSP.
SCIENCE 301 (1983) (discussing Braess‟s Paradox, which demonstrates that adding roads
to a transportation network can actually increase traffic congestion).
21. Broadband
Technology
Fact
Sheet,
PEW
RESEARCH
CTR.,
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/broadband-technology-fact-sheet/ (last visited May
29, 2015); Aaron Smith, Older Adults and Technology Use, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 3,
2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/04/03/older-adults-and-technology-use/; Aaron
Smith, Statement of Aaron Smith – Broadband Adoption: The Next Mile, PEW RESEARCH
CTR. (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/10/29/statement-of-aaron-smith-
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are not the primary reasons that people in the United States do not
have Internet access. Rather, low adoption is driven by concerns about
usability, relevance, and worries about online harms. 22 These concerns
are particularly salient among older demographics – those who would
be most likely to benefit from (or even need) Internet-based healthcare,
government, and other services.
Other issues with the idea that high-speed broadband is necessary
for these services become clear when looking at each service individually. In the case of health care, for instance, it is unlikely that residential
users would have any need for the sort of telemedicine devices that require high-speed connections.23 Rather, consumer-grade healthcare applications are more likely to be used for monitoring and reporting – applications that either send occasional large bursts of data or send
consistent, possibly latency-sensitive, small packets of data, and that in
either case do not require particularly high-speed connections. The
greater challenge for these applications is likely to come from the multiplicity of such devices – the so-called Internet of Things, where dozens
of devices in one home or millions of devices on larger networks. There
is concern that millions or billions of devices, each sending small bursts
of data, will overwhelm networks. In such cases, even if the network
provides sufficient bandwidth, it may not be able to handle the multiplicity of connections. To use the comparison with highways, the more
cars you put onto a single road, the more accidents and delays there will
be, independent of the speed limit or number of lanes. A network
transmitting 100 million small packets per second will be far more congested than one transmitting 10 million large packets per second, even
if they are both transmitting the same total amount of data. 24
broadband-adoption-the-next-mile/.
22. Broadband Fact Sheet, supra note 21; Older Adults and Technology Use, supra
note 21; Statement of Aaron Smith – Broadband Adoption: The Next Mile, supra note 21.
23. Consumer- and patient-oriented devices are unlikely to require substantial
bandwidth. Rather, they are more likely to require a reliable connection of almost any
speed. See, for example, the Pipaluck telemedicine device, a comprehensive medical examination workstation used in Greenland since 2008, which only requires a 1 mbps connection. Roslyn Layton, Broadband in Greenland: How Non-neutral Traffic Management Betters
Society,
TECH
POLICY
DAILY
(May
22,
2015,
6:00AM),
http://www.techpolicydaily.com/internet/broadband-in-greenland/ (discussing the Pipaluck). Devices that require high bandwidth, such as MRIs and other advanced imaging
devices, are generally housed in institutional settings (e.g., hospitals). Id.
24. Importantly, most network switches are provisioned in terms of the number of
packets they can switch per second, as the switching logic is more computationally intensive than copying data from an input port to an output port. For instance, the standard
line-rate gigabit Ethernet port can switch 1,488,100 packets per second. If the typical
packet size is 100 bytes, which may be typical for machine-to-machine communications,
the network will only be able to run at less than 20% of its provisioned capacity. See, e.g.,
Bandwidth, Packets Per Second, and Other Network Performance Metrics, CISCO,
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And, while each student remotely connecting to a video-based
classroom may only need a modest amount of bandwidth, on the institutional side, connecting several students to the classroom will require a
much greater amount of bandwidth for the institution as a whole. There
is legitimate concern that students need access to some sufficient level
of bandwidth at home for educational purposes, but to date there have
not been serious efforts to determine how much bandwidth is “sufficient” for educational purposes – rather, advocates‟ estimates have
tracked median consumer bandwidth preferences, which in turn track
the bandwidth requirements for high-definition streaming video content.
Similarly, the amount of bandwidth needed by a hospital for realtime telemedicine applications, even for things as simple as transferring a patient‟s MRI data to a doctor in another hospital for a “virtual”
consultation, can be substantial. So, it is certainly the case that that
these institutions need for high-speed Internet access. But the market
for these sort of institutional connections is much different from – and
much more competitive than – the market for consumer-oriented Internet access. Still, as is usually the case for commercial-quality products
compared to their consumer-oriented counterparts, Internet connections
suitable to meet these institutions‟ needs are often quite expensive, especially for public and non-profit institutions such as schools and hospitals. While current programs to assist in getting these institutions
online25 have their problems, there is a much stronger argument to be
made for government support of these institutional Internet-access
needs than for government support of consumer-oriented high-speed Internet access.
It is undoubtedly the case that broadband Internet can be an important tool for various educational, healthcare, and other social and
government services. To be sure, it is important to distinguish between
consumer-oriented Internet service and Internet service used by institutions such as schools and hospitals. These are two different markets
with different requirements.
Speed – especially “high-speed” – isn‟t the only or most important
metric to consider when provisioning these services. It is unfortunate
that advocates of government-sponsored consumer high-speed broadband Internet use the indisputable importance of services such as
healthcare and education to buttress their argument for government intervention in the high-speed broadband market. At best, this represents
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/network_performance_metrics.html
(last visited May 29, 2015).
25. See, e.g., E-Rate – Schools & Libraries USF Program, FED. COMM. COMM‟N,
https://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/e-rate-schools-libraries-usf-program (last visited May 19,
2015).
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a misunderstanding of these services‟ actual requirements. It may also
represent a willingness on the part of broadband advocates to assert
their idealized view of how the Internet should be used over the needs
of those who actually will rely on these services. At worst, it is a deliberate tactic, being used as an emotional appeal to advocate for a preferred policy that is not otherwise supportable by technical requirements.
III. PREMISE THREE: WIRELESS CAN‟T COMPETE WITH CABLE
The next premise is that wireless is not a viable competitor to wireline broadband services – and in particular that it is not a viable substitute for cable.
The basis for this premise is seemingly reasonable: both wireline
services (such as cable) and wireless services transmit data over electromagnetic spectrum. They both use the same techniques to encode
machine-intelligible bits of data into electromagnetic energy, and the
laws of physics subject both to the same constraints. Wireless carriers
in any geographic area share several hundred megahertz of spectrum,
and their signals are subject to interference from both other carriers
and natural and artificial sources.26 Coaxial cable, on the other hand,
gives a cable company (at least) roughly 800-MHz of dedicated spectrum
– several times the spectrum available to most current wireless carrier
– and transmits signals along a shielded corridor that protects them
from most sources of interference.27 Because coaxial cable offers cable
companies more spectrum than is available to wireless carriers, and because that spectrum is better shielded from interference, one may rea26. Prior to the recently-concluded AWS-3 Auction, see Public Notice: Auction of Advanced Wireless Services (AWS-3) Licenses Closes, FED. COMM. COMM‟N (Jan. 30 2015),
available at http://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-15-131A1.pdf, there were
approximately 580 MHz of spectrum available in US markets, spread across several
bands. See In the Matter of Policies Regarding Mobile Spectrum Holdings, No. 12-269,
FED.
COMM.
COMM‟N,
(May
15,
2014),
available
at
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-14-63A1.pdf (listing CMRS-licensed
spectrum bands including the 700 MHz band (70 MHz between 698 – 806 MHz), Cellular
band (50 MHz between 824-849 and 869-894 MHz), SMR band (14 MHz between 817-824
and 862-869 MHz), PCS band (120 MHZ between 1950-1910 and 1930-1990 MHz), AWS-1
(90 MHz between 1710-1755 and 2110-2155 MHz), WCS (20 MHz between 2305-23020
and 2345-2360), BRS (156.5 MHz between 2496-2690 MHz), and approximately 65 MHz
in various bands between 1670-2000 MHz. The AWS-3 and upcoming incentive auctions
are likely to yield up to 120 MHz).
27. Traditional modern cable systems (e.g., those capable of carrying 120 television
channels) typically had an 800 MHz capacity. More recent systems are installed with even
greater capacity. 1.2 and 1.8 GHz are typical. See DATA-OVER-CABLE SERVICE INTERFACE
SPECIFICATIONS, CABLE LABS, INC. § 7.2 (2013), available at http://www.cablelabs.com/wpcontent/uploads/specdocs/CM-SP-PHYv3.1-I01-131029.pdf.
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sonably expect that cable companies will always have a competitive advantage compared to wireless.
While this intuitive understanding seems reasonable, it grossly
oversimplifies the underlying technology, unsurprisingly leading to incorrect conclusions. As an initial matter, the differences between wireline and wireless explained above refer to the peak capacity of individual transmission units – i.e., a coaxial cable or cell tower – not the
capacity available to individual users. An individual coaxial cable is
typically shared by a couple hundred users; an individual cell sector
may be shared by a few to a few hundred active users. Therefore, the
correct thing to look at is each system‟s capacity per user, not the peak
capacity of the individual transmission unit, and the costs (in terms of
both money and time) of provisioning new resources to add capacity or
to address congestion.28 Whether provisioning additional capacity to
meet demand is more economic for either cable or wireless will depend
on the particular characteristics of a given network, it‟s surrounding
physical and regulatory environments, and the underlying cost structure.
More important, wireless has clear advantages over coaxial cable in
the long run. This is because anything coax can do wireless can do, too –
and there are things that wireless can do to improve performance that
coaxial cannot. As mentioned above, both technologies transmit a signal
over spectrum, and both use the same encoding techniques. Any new
encoding technique that works for a signal sent via cable will also work
for a signal sent via wireless, but cable has a fundamental limitation
compared to wireless: a cable transmits its signal, in one dimension,
along a straight line. A wireless signal is transmitted through space, in
three dimensions. This means that wireless can avail itself of transmission and reception techniques using multiple antennas – so-called spatial diversity or antenna arrays. Such systems are often referred to as
MIMO (“multiple-input, multiple-output,” referring to the number of receiving and transmitting antenna).
MIMO technologies have been taking the wireless world by storm
over the past decade – early MIMO technologies have been incorporated
into current standards for WiFi and LTE. And there is active discussion

28. Assuming a greenfield build, the economic case for wireline over wireless generally turns positive with three or more active Internet users per household. See Michael
Horney & Roslyn Layton, Innovation, Investment and Competition in Broadband and the
Impact on America‟s Digital Economy, MERCATUS CTR. (August 15, 2014), available at
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Layton-Competitionin-Broadband.pdf. This assumes
that the users do not also have mobile Internet access, or derive incremental value from
mobility. Where that is the case, the economic case for wirelines likely turns positive at an
even larger household size.
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of developing “Massive MIMO” technologies for 5G wireless networks.29
There are three primary applications for MIMO: interference mitigation, signal multiplexing, and beam-forming. By comparing the signals
received at each of multiple antennas, complex algorithms are able to
detect, and cancel-out, interference. This means that MIMO-based wireless transmissions can have interference characteristics comparable to
those of coaxial cable. Using this interference-cancellation technology,
MIMO also allows multiple signals to be sent over the same spectrum
simultaneously. In other words, a carrier with 40-MHz of spectrum
could use a 4x4 antenna to transmit 160-MHz worth of signal (4 x 40MHz carriers) in that spectrum. There is some loss as signals are added
– but MIMO systems are already able to increase capacity by 200% to
300% using 4 streams. In other words, 300-MHz of wireless spectrum
can carry as much as 800-MHz of coaxial spectrum. Massive MIMO
technologies are being developed today that could increase performance
by another factor of 30 in 5G wireless networks.
(The third basic MIMO technique, beam-forming, is a bit too complicated to explain here. Basically, using multiple antennas, a wireless
signal can be focused in a single direction (into a “beam”) – or into multiple beams, each going a specific direction. The beams don‟t interfere
with each other, such that each can use the full spectrum capacity of
the sector, allowing more users to be served by a single cell or access
point without reducing speeds available to each other user.)
Some advocates dismiss MIMO‟s capabilities by arguing that
MIMO does not work well in a mobile setting. This is not a technically
accurate statement. The correct statement is that mobile MIMO cannot
work better than fixed MIMO. MIMO technologies can work in a mobile
setting – and, indeed, they are already being implemented in LTE devices. The number of antennas that can be fit in a cellphone is limited
(typically to two) due to the size of the device; and fast-moving devices
(e.g., a cellphone in a car) receive reduced benefits from, for instance,
interference mitigation and beam-forming. But the basic technologies
do work in a mobile setting, are being deployed today, and are improving at a rapid pace.
There is a more fundamental problem with the critique that MIMO
doesn‟t work well in a mobile setting: high-speed broadband is generally
needed in fixed, not mobile, settings. That is, you are far more likely to
need high-speed broadband to watch high quality streaming video on
your large television than on your small phone. The proper comparison
between cable and wireless capacity is between cable and fixed wireless.
29. See, e.g., Erik G. Larsson et al., Massive MIMO for Next Generation Wireless
Systems, IEEE COMM., Feb 2014 (an example of an article in IEEE Communications,
which regularly includes articles discussing developments in MIMO in the 5G setting).
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Here, given the availability of, and continued development of, MIMO
technologies, the long-run advantage is with wireless. It is difficult to
argue that wireless cannot compete with cable in a world where a single
base station using 20-MHz of spectrum is capable of concurrently delivering 20 mbps service to 950 homes over a multi-mile radius.30
This is particularly true given that the capacity of cable is limited
to perhaps a couple of GHz of spectrum. Cable operators cannot change
this without massive upgrades of their infrastructure – which would
likely require replacing the last mile with fiber instead of coaxial cable.
Wireless is not subject to this limitation. As wireless applications are
reaching into the millimeter-band ranges (technically in the 30- to 300GHz range, but often also including spectrum in the 15-GHz range), engineers are developing fixed wireless systems delivering 10- to 100-gbps
class performance over multiple-kilometer distances, and mobile wireless delivering 10- to 100-mbps class performance in dense cell environments.31 Such technologies have real potential to dethrone coaxial
cable as the dominant residential fixed broadband technology.
One of the most common critiques of this possibility is that millimeter-wave spectrum is subject to substantial atmospheric attenuation,
primarily in the form of “rain fade.” Because the wavelength of millimeter-wave spectrum is similar in magnitude to the diameter of rain drops
and other atmospheric moisture, such moisture can cause substantial
degradation in signal quality. But the most recent research suggests
that rain fade is a surmountable obstacle, particularly in cellular networks but also over longer distances.32 The other common critique is
30.
31.

See, e.g., Id.
Id.; see generally EVOLUTIONARY & DISRUPTIVE VISIONS TOWARDS ULTRA HIGH
CAPACITY NETWORKS, INT‟L WIRELESS IND. CONSORTIUM (April 2, 2014), available at
https://www.keysight.com/main/editorial.jspx?cc=US&lc=eng&ckey=2280123
&id=2280123&cmpid=46278; see also Eric Torkildson, et al, Millimeter-wave MIMO: Wireless Links at Optical Speeds, ALLERTON CONF. ON COMM., CONTROL, & COMP. PROC. 44
(2006), available at http://www.ece.ucsb.edu/wcsl/Publications/mm_MIMO_Allerton06.pdf;
see also Mark Jackson, Ericsson Trial 10Gbps 5G Mobile Broadband Network in Japan,
ISPREVIEW
(May
12,
2014,
8:36AM),
http://www.ispreview.co.uk/index.php/2014/05/ericsson-trial-possible-10gbps-5g-mobilebroadband-network-japan.html (discussing testing of 10gbps+ cellular technologies in the
15 GHz band).
32. Torkildson, supra note 31, at 4 ("a 5 Gbps link over a 1 km range, even in heavy
25 mm/hr rain, can be maintained with only 160 mW transmit power at each subarray.");
F. Versluis, Millimetre wave radio technology, MICROWAVE ENG‟G EUR. 33 (Nov 2008)
(“The physical properties of high-frequency radio transmission in the presence of various
weather conditions are well understood. With proven models of worldwide weather characteristics available, link distances [in the 71 - 86 GHz range] of several miles can confidently be realized over most of the globe. ... New millimetre wave radio systems can provide „fibre like‟ connectivity at distances of up to 2 miles in cities such as New York, and
can deliver significantly longer lines in cities with drier climates.”); Theodore Rappaport,
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that the power required to transmit at millimeter-wave frequencies is
substantially greater that that required to transmit in the traditional
CMRS bands – and, to a lesser extent, that the signal processing required by MIMO technologies also requires more power than traditional
signal processing. Both of these are valid concerns in the mobile setting.
In the fixed wireless setting, where radio equipment does not rely on
battery power, these issues are not a serious concern.
And while the characteristics of mobile devices – that they are
small and mobile – means that they will not be able to reap these benefits to the same extent as fixed wireless networks, they too stand to see
marked improvements in performance with these technologies. Indeed,
the short wavelength of millimeter-wave spectrum means that mobile
devices operating on that spectrum are better able to take advantage of
MIMO technologies. In particular, the shorter wavelength means that
more antenna can be placed in a single device, substantially increasing
the device‟s resistance to interference and signal fade and increasing
the potential bandwidth available to the device. 33 This next generation
of devices therefore has the potential to offer better performance than
current lower-frequency spectrum technologies. It is entirely possible
that the next generation of mobile wireless devices will offer performance comparable to what is available from cable Internet providers
today; in the future they may even be on parity with then-available caet al, Millimeter Wave Mobile Communications for 5GCellular: It Will Work!, 1 IEEE
ACCESS
335,
338
(May
2013),
available
at
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6515173 ("A common myth in
the wireless engineering community is that rain and atmosphere make mm-wave spectrum useless for mobile communications. However, when one considers the fact that today's cell sizes in urban environments are on the order of 200 m, it becomes clear that
mm-wave cellular can overcome these issues. Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 show the rain attenuation
and atmospheric absorption characteristics of mm-wave propagation. It can be seen that
for cell sizes on the order of 200 m, atmospheric absorption does not create significant additional path loss for mm-waves, particularly at 28 GHz and 38 GHz. Only 7 dB/km of attenuation is expected due to heavy rainfall rates of 1 inch/hr for cellular propagation at 28
GHz, which translates to only 1.4 dB of attenuation over 200 m distance. Work by many
researchers has [demonstrated] that for small distances (less than 1 km), rain attenuation
will present a minimal effect on the propagation of mm-waves at 28 GHz to 38 GHz for
small cells.”); Zhao, et al, 28 GHz Millimeter Wave Cellular Communication Measurements for Reﬂection and Penetration Loss in and around Buildings in New York City,
2013 IEEE INT‟L CONF. ON COMMS. 1 (June 2013) (“In addition, despite myths to the contrary, rain attenuation and oxygen loss does not signiﬁcantly increase at 28 GHz, and, in
fact, may offer better propagation conditions as compared to today‟s cellular networks
when one considers the availability of high gain adaptive antennas and cell sizes on the
order of 200 meters.”).
33. T. S. RAPPAPORT ET AL., MILLIMETER WAVE WIRELESS COMMUNICATION (Prentice
Hall, 2014); See also Tianyang Bai & Robert W. Heath, Jr., Coverage and Rate Analysis
for Millimeter Wave Cellular Networks, 14 IEEE TRANS. WIRELESS COMM‟S.1100, 1100
(2015) (citing same).
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ble offerings.
And lest we forget, portability is a desirable characteristic that itself creates a great deal of value for many consumers. Here, consumers
have been voting with their wallets in ways that demonstrate the value
of mobility. This is a fundamental point that those who assert wireless
cannot compete with wireline broadband have yet to confront: evidence
shows that for many consumers wireless does compete. 34 Wireless
broadband subscription growth is outpacing wireline broadband growth
by double-digit percentages in the US and other countries around the
world. Mobile broadband has proven to be attractive relative to wireline
for several discrete populations. This is particularly true for some minority groups, younger or single demographics, and those who move or
travel frequently.35
Contrary to common assertions by many who would like to see the
market for high-speed Internet service more broadly regulated – and
especially by those who see government-sponsored deployment of highspeed broadband infrastructure as the necessary response to a perceived lack of competition in the communications industry – wireless is
a strong potential competitor to cable Internet. Today, wireless may
play a limited role as a competitor to wireline Internet services, but its
future as a competitor is bright. Indeed, the technological opportunities
for growth in wireless capacity likely exceed those available to coaxbased broadband providers and should provide comfort to those who are
worried about the relative lack of competition in today‟s communications marketplace.
IV. PREMISE FOUR: AN OPEN INTERNET IS NECESSARY FOR
INNOVATION AND NECESSARILY BENEFITS CONSUMERS
While it is true that openness can facilitate some types of innovation, it both precludes other forms of innovation and imposes costs of its
own.36 In the telecommunications context, openness is mostly about
network neutrality – the idea that broadband providers should not be
able to charge users or content providers for preferential access to specific services, let alone block specific content or services entirely (absent
34. In Denmark 7 percent of the population has chosen to rely solely on 3G or 4G
mobile connectivity. Mobile-only broadband subscribers outnumber FTTH subscribers by
100,000, even though 100 mbps connections are available to 70 percent of the population.
See Roslyn Layton, The European Union's Broadband Challenge, AM. ENTER. INST. (Feb.
19, 2014), http://www.aei.org/publication/the-european-unions-broadband-challenge/.
35
Mary Madden et al., Teens, Social Media, and Privacy, PEW RESEARCH CTR.
(May 21, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/05/21/teens-social-media-and-privacy/.
36. For one of the seminal treatments of this subject, see Timothy Bresnahan &
Manuel Trajtenberg, General Purpose Technologies “Engines of Growth?”, 65 J.
ECONOMETRICS 83, 94–96 (1995).
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some compelling legal or technical justification).
The key takeaway from the relevant technical and economic literatures is that “openness,” in whatever forms it may take, is rarely unambiguously good or bad. It is unquestionably the case that open access
can facilitate certain types of innovation. It reduces R&D and other
transaction costs (especially search and negotiation costs to get permission or access to use existing infrastructure) and reduces opportunities
for rent extraction by those who otherwise control an infrastructure. On
the other hand, it makes some forms of innovation more expensive or
difficult to implement.
There is substantial literature showing the benefits of vertical integration37 and the importance of defining proper modular boundaries. 38
Nowadays, however, this point can be made more simply by analogy:
Apple‟s hardware and software designs are part of a tightly-controlled,
vertically integrated, closed product ecosystem. Apple would not exist if
we had the equivalent of network neutrality for computer hardware or
software. This does not mean that either an open or a closed model is
necessarily better in any given case; it does mean that we want a more
nuanced approach than one that mandates either approach in every
situation.
It should be noted that engineers employed by the Department of
Defense to develop the then top secret project of the ARPANET, the
forerunner of today‟s internet, did not work in an “open” environment.
Openness or neutrality was not a goal for the design of that system.
This is not to say that they would have frowned on such concepts, but as
ARPANET engineer and co-author of the original “end to end paper”
David Clark explains:
Back then we didn‟t use the word „open‟. It‟s not really part of our language. We understood generality…if you go back to the end to end
paper I wrote with Jerry Saltzer and David Reed – which has been
used as a religious tract far beyond what it will sustain if you are a
strict constructionist (A person who construes a legal text or document
in a specified way) – I believe I verified that the paper does not contain word „open‟. That paper was about correctness, which is a narrow
objective. It‟s not even about performance.39

The assertion that the internet was “always open and neutral” isn‟t
necessarily the characterizations of its founding engineers.
37. See also Brent Skorup & Adam Theirer, Uncreative Destruction: The Misguided
War on Vertical Integration in the Information Economy, 65 FED. COMMS. L.J., no. 2, Apr.
2013, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2162623.
38. Id.
39. Julius Genachowski, Open Internet Advisory Committee Meeting, FED. COMM.
COMM’N (July 20, 2012, 10:00AM), http://www.fcc.gov/events/open-internet-

advisory-committee-meeting (at minute 65).
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There is no doubt that platforms can have market power, but there
is also evidence that consumers benefit from the bundling effects of
platforms. The point is openness and neutrality can have both welfare
enhancing and welfare reducing effects, but a blanket standard applied
to just one part of the Internet or all parts of the Internet will likely
have negative consequences for consumers. It may be better to adjudicate these matters on an ex post, case-by-case, basis to ensure that consumers are not deprived by the preclusion of any technology or business
model
The scale is tipped even further against mandated openness and
neutrality in the case of the Internet when looking at the literature of
two-sided markets, which numbers more than 360,000 articles and is
less than a decade old. The Internet is a two-sided market – a market
in which two or more distinct groups of consumers are brought together
via some intermediary platform. That is, users and Internet content
providers (e.g., firms such as Google, Facebook, and Netflix) reach each
other via the Internet. This has both technical and economic implications.
On the technical side most historical perspectives on the Internet
architecture make clear that, while it has long had an “open” character,
this character is at least in part accidental, does not equate with “neutrality,” and in any event may be undesirable.40
40. For a sampling of technical literature explaining that mandated network neutrality is not desirable, see Richard T.B. Ma et al., On Cooperative Settlement Between
Content, Transit and Eyeball Internet Service Providers, 19 IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON
NETWORKING
802,
812-813
(June
2011)
available
at
http://dnapubs.cs.columbia.edu/citation/paperfile/194/ToN_InternetEco2.pdf (“Paid-peering is identical to zero-dollar peering in terms of trafﬁc forwarding, except that one party needs to
pay another. By applying the Shapley revenue distribution to the Content-Transit-Eyeball
model, we ﬁnd the justiﬁcation of the existence of paid-peering between transit ISPs. ...
“Our previous work ... showed that ... selfish ISPs have incentives to perform globally optimal routing and interconnecting decisions to reach an equilibrium that maximizes both
individual profit and global social welfare. ... In this paper we extend our model ... Our
result [finds instances where paid-peering can benefit welfare].”); David Clark, Network
Neutrality: Words of Power and 800-Pound Gorillas, 1 INT‟L J. COMM. 701, 705-706 (2007),
available at http://groups.csail.mit.edu/ana/Publications/PubPDFs/Network-NeutralityWords%20of%20Power%20and%20800-Pound%20Gorillas.pdf (“As a technical mechanism, QoS seems to be beneficial. It directly addresses the real performance requirements
of different sorts of Internet traffic … This reality begs the question of whether we can
find a set of rules that might distinguish between “good” or “acceptable” forms of discrimination, and “bad” discrimination. Unless we can find a bright line, using regulation of
discrimination to define acceptable behavior may cause more trouble than it cures.”);
Thomas Hazlett & Joshua Wright, The Law and Economics of Network Neutrality, 45 IND.
L. REV. 767, 785 (2011), available at http://mckinneylaw.iu.edu/ILR/pdf/vol45p767.pdf
(quoting 2009 Comm Daily discussion with David Clark: “‟The network is not neutral and
never has been,‟” Clark said, dismissing as „happy little bunny rabbit dreams‟ the assumptions of net neutrality supporters that there was once a „Garden of Eden‟ for the Internet.
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Similarly, on the economic side, the crux of the two-sided markets
analysis is that the platform that brings the different sides together –
that is, broadband Internet access providers – ordinarily charge either
or both sides of the market for access to the other. How much to charge
each side, including whether to charge either side nothing or even to
subsidize one side‟s access to the platform, involves a complex set of
tradeoffs – and, most important, how much each side is charged can
have substantial effects on the social value of the network. Critically,
and we will say this in italics because it is so important, the literature
studying two-sided markets consistently shows that there is no reason to
believe that a network neutrality rule necessarily benefits consumers,

NSFnet, an early part of the Internet backbone, gave priority to interactive traffic, he
said: „You„ve got to discriminate between good blocking and bad blocking.‟”); Jon
Crowcroft, Net Neutrality: The Technical Side of the Debate, 1 INT‟L J. COMM. 567, 567
(2007), available at http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/159/84 (“This paper describes the basic realities of the net, which has never been a level playing field for many
accidental and some deliberate reasons”; “In conclusion then: We never had network neutrality in the past, and I do not believe we should engineer for it in the future either.”);
Douglas A. Hass, The Never-Was-Neutral Net and Why Informed End Users Can End the
Net Neutrality Debates, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1565 (2007), available at
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1717&context=btlj;
S.
Blake et al., An Architecture for Differentiated Services, REQUEST FOR COMMENTS 2475, at
2 (Dec. 1998), available at https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2475 (“Service differentiation is
desired to accommodate heterogeneous application requirements and user expectations,
and to permit differentiated pricing of Internet service.”); K. Nichols et al., A Two-Bit Differentiated Services Architecture for the Internet, REQUEST FOR COMMENTS 2638, at 3 (July
1999), available at https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2638 (discussing paid prioritization, saying: “It is expected that premium traffic would be allocated a small percentage of the total
network capacity, but that it would be priced much higher.”); R. Braden et al., Integrated
Services in the Internet Architecture: An Overview, REQUEST FOR COMMENTS 1633, at 1
(July 1994), available at https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1633 (“real-time applications often
do not work well across the Internet because of variable queueing delays and congestion
losses. The Internet, as originally conceived, offers only a very simple quality of service
(QoS), point-to-point best-effort data delivery. Before real-time applications such as remote video, multimedia conferencing, visualization, and virtual reality can be broadly
used, the Internet infrastructure must be modified to support real-time QoS, which provides some control over end-to-end packet delays.” ... “The first assumption is that resources (e.g., bandwidth) must be explicitly managed in order to meet application requirements. … An alternative approach, which we reject, is to attempt to support realtime traffic without any explicit changes to the Internet service model. The essence of real-time service is the requirement for some service guarantees, and we argue that guarantees cannot be achieved without reservations. … We conclude that there is an inescapable
requirement for routers to be able to reserve resources, in order to provide special QoS for
specific user packet streams, or „flows‟.”); see also Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, An unfounded
principle: Ammori‟s non-neutral network history, TECH POLICY DAILY (Nov. 13, 2013,
6:00AM),
http://www.techpolicydaily.com/internet/unfounded-principle-ammoris-nonneutral-network-history/ (explaining that network neutrality is not “a foundational principle” of the Internet).
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and consistently shows that such a rule can harm consumers.41
In practice, a network neutrality rule is little more than a subsidy
from the consumer side of the market to the content provider side of the
market.42 Some, but not all, content providers benefit from this rule.
Other content providers may be harmed by such a rule – especially
those who offer, or would like to develop, services that would benefit
from enhanced quality of service features or other features that may require some integration with Internet service providers.
Even more problematic, a network neutrality rule can harm consumers. It prevents ISPs and content providers from working together
to offer innovative new products that consumers want. More tragic, it
prevents these providers from developing lower-cost service packages –
41. The literature here is voluminous, often demonstrates benefits from nonneutrality, and consistently notes ambiguous results. For some examples (most of which
cite to the broader literature). See Nicholas Economides & Joacim Tåg, Network neutrality
on the Internet: A two-sided market analysis, 24 INFO. ECON. & POLICY 91, 100 (2012) (“We
have showed that one can find such parameter ranges both in the monopoly model and in
the duopoly model suggesting that network neutrality regulation could be warranted even
when some competition is present in the platform market. However, the overall effect of
implementing network neutrality regulations can still be both positive and negative depending on parameter values.”) (emphasis added); Paul Njoroge et al, Investment in TwoSided Markets and the Net Neutrality Debate, 12 REV. NETWORK ECON. 355, 356 (Feb
2014),
available
at
http://www.columbia.edu/~gyw2105/GYW/GabrielWeintraub_files/RNE_paper_NN.pdf
(“This paper adds to the growing body of formal economic analysis that will help inform
policy makers on the net neutrality debate and sheds light on the validity, or lack thereof,
of the arguments proposed by the different advocacy groups involved. In particular, this
article develops a game theoretic model based on a two-sided market framework … to investigate the effects of a net neutrality mandate on investment incentives of ISPs, and its
concomitant effects on social welfare, consumer and CP surplus, and CP market participation. ... More speciﬁcally, the results regarding the comparison between the neutral and
non-neutral regimes for our theoretical and numerical-simulation models are as follows.
In both models, the non-neutral regime leads to a higher overall social welfare. This result
is driven by the higher investment levels caused by the non-neutral regime, which in turn
increase consumer surplus and CP gross surplus.”) (emphasis added); Jay Pil Choi &
Byung-Cheol Kim, Net Neutrality and Investment Incentives, 41 RAND J. ECON. 446, 466
(2010) (“Considering all three channels through which net neutrality can have an influence upon short-run total welfare, we can conclude that static welfare implications of net
neutrality regulations depend on the trade-off between transportation cost saving and inefficient production. If the margin difference is significantly large relative to the degree of
product differentiation, the discriminatory network would be preferred from the viewpoint
of social welfare.” “We find that the relationship between the net neutrality regulation
and investment incentives is subtle. Even though we cannot draw general unambiguous
conclusions, we identified key effects that are expected to play important roles in the assessment of net neutrality regulations.”).
42. See, e.g., Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Let Them Eat Cake and Watch Netflix, 8 FREE
STATE
FOUND.
PERSPECTIVES,
no.
22,
2013,
available
at
http://www.freestatefoundation.org/images/Let_Them_Eat_Cake_and_Watch_Netflix_090
413.pdf.
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packages that could expand opportunities for access to currently underserved and disadvantaged communities. These rules likely increase cost
of access and limit the development of potentially cheaper offerings that
are more responsive to consumer demands – this is exactly the opposite
of good telecom policy.
This point relates back to a concern in the first premise considered
above: the paramount importance of respecting consumer preferences,
and not substituting the Washington-Silicon Valley-academic views of
what consumers should want for what they actually do want (and, more
importantly, need). By requiring that every consumer‟s Internet connection offers full-fare, first-class service, complete with movies, television,
and free drink service, we price consumers who would be happy with
discounted-fare economy Internet service out of the market.
We don‟t mean to give away the barn. The key takeaways from the
literature in this field are all nuanced – different price structures “can”
or “may” benefit or harm consumers. In some cases, “non-neutral” price
structures may benefit consumers, in some it may harm them, and vice
versa. But this does not mean that we should prescribe ex ante prophylactic pricing rules – rather, it means that we should monitor conduct
and pricing in the Internet ecosystem and be ready to bring ex post actions against pricing decisions that are demonstrably harmful to consumers.
V. PREMISE FIVE: TELECOMMUNICATIONS ARE BETTER IN
EUROPE, ASIA, OR SOMEWHERE ELSE
The final premise is that things are better in Europe, Asia, or other
regions of the world – or, from their perspectives, in America. A corollary premise is that such a comparison matters at all. This premise,
frequently expressed as “America falling behind in ____ (fill in the
blank),” is a common refrain for the policy crise du jour. Essentially it
says that America, and other nations, are simply the sum of a single
measure. It begs the question as to better for what and for whom and
to what end. Similar concern can be seen in other countries. As Neelie
Kroes, EU Commissioner for the Digital Agenda, has frequently declared, “High speed networks are the backbone of the digital market but
compared to international competitors, Europe lags behind in providing
those networks – fixed and wireless.”43
Comparative rankings of global Internet speeds and prices are a
staple of telecom debates. They feature prominently in the work of ad43.
Jake Sturmer, Slow Internet „Not Sustainable,‟ Tech Chief at Browdband World
Forum in Amsterdam Says, ABC NEWS AUSTRALIA (Oct. 23, 2013, 5:16PM) available at
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-10-24/slow-broadband-nbn-amsterdam-neeliekroes/5042068.
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vocates across the political spectrum and the past year has seen at least
three major efforts to study the relative costs and speeds of Internet access around the world: the ITIF,44 ITU,45 OTI46, Christopher Yoo,47 and
AEI/Richard Bennett48. Smaller scale, but no less important, work has
been undertaken by scholars such as Susan Crawford 49 and Roslyn Layton.50
With regard to broadband in the popular press, the “America is falling behind” assertion is “evidenced” by reference to citing a specific statistics on speed or price without proper context. Cherry picking any one
measure or data point can make a country look good or bad, but that
doesn‟t translate into bankable insight for economic growth, let alone
informed policymaking. Being the “best” in any broadband measure
matters little if it does not does not improve social welfare or make an
economy and its workforce more productive. Indeed, such cherrypicking has even been used by the FCC, selectively using data from its
own reports to support its preferred conclusions.51 For instance, on January 29, 2015, the FCC released two related reports, international
broadband performance and the definition of broadband.52
44. RICHARD BENNET ET AL., THE WHOLE PICTURE: WHERE AMERICA‟S BROADBAND
NETWORKS REALLY STAND, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. (Feb. 2013), available at
http://www2.itif.org/2013-whole-picture-america-broadband-networks.pdf.
45. COSMAS ZAVAZAVA ET AL., MEASURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 2013, INT‟L
TELECOMM.
UNION
(2013),
available
at
https://www.itu.int/en/ITUD/Statistics/Documents/publications/mis2013/MIS2013_without_Annex_4.pdf
46. Nick Russo et al., THE COST OF CONNECTIVITY 2014, NEW AM. FOUND. (2014)
available
at
https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/229-the-cost-of-connectivity2014/OTI_The_Cost_of_Connectivity_2014.pdf.
47. Christopher Yoo, U.S. vs. European Broadband: What Do the Data Say?, INST.
FOR
L.
&
ECON.
RESEARCH,
Paper
No.
14-35
(2014),
https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/3352-us-vs-european-broadband-deployment.
48. RICHARD BENNETT, G7 BROADBAND DYNAMICS: HOW POLICY AFFECTS
BROADBAND IN POWERHOUSE NATIONS, AM. ENT. INST. (2014), available at
http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/G7-Broadband-Dynamics-Final.pdf.
49. SUSAN CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE AUDIENCE: THE TELECOM INDUSTRY AND MONOPOLY
POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (Yale Univ. Press, 2012).
50. Layton, supra note 34; Horney & Layton, supra note 28.
51. See Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Regulating the Most Powerful Network Ever, 10 FREE
STATE
FOUND.
PERSPECTIVES,
no.
9,
2015,
available
at
http://www.freestatefoundation.org/images/Regulating_the_Most_Powerful_Network_Eve
r_021815.pdf.
52. 2015 Broadband Progress Report and Notice of Inquiry, In the Matter of Inquiry
Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment, No. 14-126, FED. COMM. COMM‟N (Jan 29, 2015), available at
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-15-10A1.pdf; Fourth Report, In the
Matter of International Comparison Requirements Pursuant to the Broadband Data Improvement Act, No. 14-126, FED. COMM. COMM‟N (Jan. 29, 2015), available at
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The International broadband report found, among other things,
that the US has the among the lowest cost Internet service when measured in terms of cost-per-gigabyte; it also finds that the US has significantly better rural high-speed Internet coverage than Europe (roughly
45% vs. roughly 13%).53 Yet the broadband definition report simply ignores these data, focusing instead only on data that show the US to be
behind other countries – while noting that the FCC is statutorily required to consider factors such as it ignores.54
The faulty premise of the assertion implies that broadband itself,
measured by a discrete variable such as speed, is the end goal. However it is arguably more important not to view broadband as an end in itself, but as an enabler of social and economic value. Viewed in this way,
we need to take a more comprehensive, holistic view of broadband that
encompasses not just networks and their characteristics, but adoption,
applications, digital readiness, market development, and so on. Indeed
the OECD Council‟s principles55 for Internet policy embrace a range of
broad outcomes, but no one metric of speed or network type.
There is an assertion that we need better, faster broadband for the
sake of “innovation”, but there is no reliable measure of broadband as
an input to innovation. The OECD reports that broadband penetration
has only a mild correlation to GDP in its member countries. 56 Innovation is highly complex and results from the interplay of many factors in
a larger innovation ecosystem comprising entrepreneurs, firms, human
and financial capital, knowledge and technologies, market structure,
and so on.
From an economic perspective, America‟s historic broadband policy,
which focuses on dynamic competition between networks and a limited
role for government has been successful to stimulate investment in
broadband networks in a nearly unprecedented scale, some $1.2 trillion
since 1996 and ongoing high rate of investment per capita for some
time. This contrasts with European investment, which has largely fallen across the continent on a per capita basis. As one of us has explained
elsewhere:
A decade ago, the EU accounted for one-third of the world‟s communications capital expenditure. Today, the EU‟s share has plummeted to
less than one-fifth. Americans, on the other hand, are just 4% of the
world‟s population, have enjoyed one-fourth of the world‟s broadband
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-15-132A1.pdf.
53. See Hurwitz, Regulating the Most Powerful Network Ever, supra note 41.
54. Id.
55. OECD COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION ON PRINCIPLES FOR INTERNET POLICY
MAKING, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (2011), available at
http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/49258588.pdf
56. See Layton, supra note 34.
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capex for a decade. In fact, per capita investment in the US is twice
that of Europe, and the gap is growing.57

At this point, it has been amply demonstrated that the idea that
the US is “falling behind” is debatable at best.58 We might not have the
fastest Internet in the world – but the countries who do often lament
the low adoption rates seen after billions of dollars of state-sponsored
investment. We might not have the cheapest very-high-speed Internet
access in the world – but we have some of lowest prices for access to entry-level high-speed Internet–which is most important for consumers,
especially when the essential set of services does not require high
speeds and, as much as we lament how much better everything is in
other countries, those other countries lament how much better things
are in the United States.
The results of this market-driven investment are clear: US consumers enjoy significantly higher rates of access to cable, LTE, FTTH,
and 100+mbps broadband than their European peers. Despite this
higher per-capita investment, these numbers also show that when you
include fees collected by the government (e.g., taxes and media licensing), US consumers pay less for broadband than their European counterparts.
When taking these points into consideration, it is difficult to deduce
that America is falling behind in broadband. America‟s broadband networks have allowed the country to develop new digital industries and
transform old ones. Users are on track to consume more data than any
country in world. A more correct premise may be to pursue the level of
broadband development appropriate to America‟s economic and social
needs, rather than aspiring to be the “best”, which is certainly subjective and not necessarily welfare-enhancing for consumers.
There is a perhaps even more important question than whether the
US has the fastest Internet in the world: does it even matter? We talk
about these comparisons because we don‟t have a better way to assess
our spending on broadband infrastructure. However, we could unquestionably have the world‟s fastest broadband service if we wanted – all it
takes is money. Would such an investment at a scale to ensure we
would top the Internet speed rankings from now and into eternity make
sense? Probably not. We could also have the world‟s fastest roads, high57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Id.; Yoo, supra note 37; see also Richard Bennett, Not Falling Behind,
TECH. POLICY DAILY (Dec. 30, 2013, 5:12PM), http://www.techpolicydaily.com/ communications/falling-behind/; Richard Bennet, Qu‟ils Mangent de la Brioche?, TECH. POLICY
DAILY (Oct. 28, 2013, 8:50PM), http://www.techpolicydaily.com/internet/quils-mangent-dela-brioche/; Sarah Leggin, Less Is Not Necessarily More, 8 FREE STATE FOUND.
PERSPECTIVES,
no.
35,
2013,
available
at
http://freestatefoundation.org/images/Less_is_Not_Necessarily_More_122313.pdf.
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est literacy and graduation rates, safest schools, largest airports, and
cleanest energy – if we were willing to pay for any of these things. Figuring out how much to spend on any of these priorities requires a complex set of tradeoffs that is ignored by advocates concerned with whether average broadband speeds in the United States are a few percent
slower than our friends in Europe. And it bears emphasizing that even
the studies most critical of US broadband speeds show only minor differences in absolute speed between ordinal rankings. (And recall, as
discussed in the second premise, speed and cost are only two of many
metrics important to understanding the value of broadband Internet access – others, especially latency and jitter, can be as or even more important than speed.)
If we are to have a coherent discussion about how fast our Internet
architecture should be, we need to have a more sophisticated goal than
“faster than anyone else.” In particular, we need a more sophisticated
metric than just speed. More speed will always be better than less
speed; and more speed can always be acquired by expending more resources. The race to have the fastest Internet in the world, therefore, is
little more than a race to spend resources. Maximization always needs
to be done subject to some constraint. Rather than comparing speeds,
we should instead think about why we value high-speed (and, then,
higher-speed) Internet service, and how marginal increases in Internet
speeds affect that goal.
VI. PART SIX: THE ROLE OF TELECOM RESEARCH IN TELECOM
POLICY
Having looked at several important, but problematic, premises in
current telecommunications policy debates, we now turn to consider
several themes that run through these premises and also the role of telecommunications research in telecommunications policy debates.
A first theme seen in several of these premises is constrained vs.
unconstrained optimization, and the selection of relevant metrics and
policy levers – or, stated differently, consideration of benefits of a given
policy change without respect to costs or costs without respect to benefits. Thus, it will always be the case that more bandwidth is better than
less, and that if we are willing to spend more money we can have better
or faster networks. It is meaningless to discuss how robust networks
should be without consideration of the value of applications that more
robust networks may support as compared to the cost of building out
those more robust networks.
Related to this, there has been surprisingly little attention paid to
the requirements of applications running over broadband networks.
What we expect of networks has been driven by the requirements of
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median uses of networks. This, in turn, has largely tracked the bandwidth (and other) requirements for streaming video. But streaming video‟s technical requirements are different from many other applications
– it generally requires orders of magnitude more bandwidth than any
other applications, and is less sensitive to latency and jitter than many
other important applications.
The focus on supporting the requirements for video has been driven
in large part by the high private value placed on streaming video. It is
almost certainly the case that video is the Internet‟s “killer app” – the
one thing for which consumers are likely to pay the most. But the social
value of online video is likely small relative to other applications – and
these other applications likely have very different technical requirements. Thus, the goal of provisioning ubiquitous high-speed Internet
access is at odds with provisioning ubiquitous access to important
online educational, health care, employment, and government service
resources. In a world of unconstrained resources we would of course
have unlimited bandwidth connectivity that supported universal access
to these socially-valuable resources. But in a world of constrained resources, we face a tradeoff between the rate of provisioning networks
that support the most resource-intensive and highest private-value services and the rate of provisioning more modest networks that support
the most socially-valuable services but that may not support the highest
private-value services.
This idea of constrained vs. unconstrained optimization doesn‟t only
apply on the policy side: it also applies on the application side. A common definition of engineering is solving problems subject to constraints.
Good engineers find ways to work within technical constraints – but in
the telecom arena, engineers have the option of petitioning the government to obviate those constraints. This is one understanding of the
modern network neutrality debate, combined with arguments for universal availability of low-cost high-speed broadband access: proponents
are trying to leverage regulation to overcome technical constraints; opponents are advocating engineering the network to work within these
constraints. Neither of these approaches is necessarily “better” or
“worse” than the other, let alone “right” or “wrong.” Indeed, the best approach is probably the combination of both that minimizes the cost of
building new infrastructure subject to the constraint of engineers‟ ability to design applications that can run on the available network resources.
Another aspect of the premises considered above is that they are often framed in terms that have substantial emotional valence. This can
again be framed in terms of constrained vs. unconstrained optimization.
Arguments with strong emotional valence are framed to overcome or
deny practical constraints – at a policy level, to say that something is

484

J. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & PRIVACY LAW

[Vol. XXXI

necessary is to say that it must be provided no matter the cost. Thus,
we need to have universally available, open, high-speed networks in order to support various applications (both socially and commercially necessary). However an appeal to emotional valence – really, any argument
that denies marginal constraint – is rarely analytically rigorous. Indeed, from an economic perspective “necessary” services will have very
inelastic demand, and therefore are often the most likely services to be
provisioned by the market.
A single thread has run throughout this discussion: good telecommunications policy is rarely simple. The premises considered above are
faulty because they are binary and unbounded. They yield policy prescriptions that are invariant with respect to any state of the world: we
must always invest more in building consistently faster wireline networks; those networks must always be neutral and support both privately-and socially-valuable applications.
Sound policy demands constraint – and sound policy should reject
premises that do not submit to constraint. One of the most important
roles of research is to identify those constraints and to operationalize
them into meaningful policy levers. Much of the literature that this paper relies upon is in one sense very unsatisfactory. The technical and
economic literature relating to general purpose technologies and network neutrality, for instance, is unambiguously ambiguous. At the
same time, this is perhaps some of the most important literature for
modern telecommunications policy, precisely because it identifies a
range of outcomes and relevant factors to consider in understanding
why the market may obtain various results within that range. In a
world where the lines between research, policy, and advocacy are often
blurry the most important research may not be that which provides answers but rather that raises questions.
CONCLUSION
In examining the faulty premises of telecom policy, we acknowledge
our own premise, that telecom policy should be informed by critical
analysis and evidence not just normative statements, however compelling they may sound. We consider addressing consumer needs as the ultimate goal, but demonstrate that seemingly consumer-friendly policies,
when they don‟t take into account the complexities of economics and engineering, can have the opposite or negative effects of what they intended. The faulty premises are examined to improve policy proposals,
transcend the narrow interests of specific groups, and create better outcomes for consumers.
The first premise is that everyone needs low-cost access to high
speed broadband. Users have a diverse set of needs, which might not
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reflect the preferences of Washington or Silicon Valley. We explore the
historical notion of basic telephone service and find that is has limited
application to inform what kind of services should be part of the basic
bundle of social commitments today. Emergency, employment, health,
government, and e-commerce applications don‟t require high speeds.
Thus a question remains whether high speed video should be part of the
basic set of essential services. Indeed rich media is not driven necessarily by consumer demand, but rather the bandwidth and technology
that make it available. Furthermore rich multi-media is not accessible
to the deaf and blind, so a key group is already marginalized by insisting that video is an essential service.
An alternative approach to mandating high speeds at low cost is to
require that essential services be developed so that they do not require
high speed broadband. Another pro-consumer policy would be to move
away from defining broadband in terms of speed (mbps) but instead offer categories of service depending on application, e.g. a basic services
package for health, education, government, and employment applications versus a streaming video package. This will make it easier to enforce remedies that ensure providers fulfill their obligations with a particular package, rather than to attempt to deliver everything on a given
speed.
We examine the specific bandwidth requirements for key applications in health and education and show that the bandwidth needs for
these services are modest and thus we expose the fallacy that high
speeds are needed so that these essential services can be realized.
Moreover we demonstrate that speed is not the only important aspect of
broadband. For certain health and education applications, which require real time communications, the elimination of latency, jitter and
packet loss are more important.
We challenge the notion that wireless can't compete with cable.
While wireless may have certain limitations currently, in the short
term, its portability makes it the preferred broadband connection for an
increasing number of people. In the mid- to long-term, as wireless
moves into millimeter-wave bands accessing many GHz of capacity,
wireless may well supplant cable in terms of throughput. In any case,
it‟s important to recognize that different users may value the technologies differently, and it is by no means a fait accompli that basic set of
services can only be realized on one kind of technology.
In current telecom debates the premise that openness and neutrality are perquisites for innovation border on religious dogma, but we find
that this premise too is not necessarily true. Indeed openness and neutrality are not unambiguously good or bad. Openness may facilitate
some innovation, but inhibit others. We see a variety of open and closed
business models in which consumers benefit. Furthermore openness
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and neutrality are under-theorized concepts in the academic literature
of innovation, and there is little evidence for the benefits they are purported to provide.
In fact, not only do the most cited articles of the net neutrality literature conflict about the welfare effects of the policy, a review of the
literature of innovation suggests that openness and neutrality are not
key drivers for innovation. However, the literature notes other salient
factors for innovation such as the joining of complementary assets, 59
partnerships, and the need to look “outside the box” for new ideas. 60 We
find that, ironically, proposed net neutrality policies may prohibit the
very things that the literature suggests promote innovation, namely
partnerships. In any case, it may be premature to build a regulatory regime on the notion of net neutrality, which lacks intellectual consensus
on the issue of market failure, let alone the build a regulatory regime of
an a priori concept that mandates openness while prohibiting other
models. Until more evidence is available, an ex post case by case approach to determine whether consumers are being harmed by any particular model is prudent.
We investigate the claims that telecommunications are better in
Europe, Asia, or somewhere else. We find the statement “America is
falling behind” is a common refrain across a number of policy issues
where emotion and fear overrule analysis and rigor. No country is the
sum of a single measure. As such, the myopic focus on broadband as an
end in itself, by simply the sum of discrete measures such as speed or
price, miss important nuances about how broadband is create economic
and social value. Simply put, broadband is not an end in itself but an
enabler.
There is no value in being the “best” in any broadband metric if it
does not increase economic or social welfare. Assertions that America is
falling behind in broadband are frequently based on cherry-picked data
taken out of context to gratuitously support a particular policy position.
Informed policymaking on broadband necessarily requires the analysis
of many measures and a holistic perspective.
The sixth section reviews the themes that run through the policy
debates, namely constrained vs. unconstrained optimization. There is a
lack of attention to bandwidth requirements of applications, which is
arguably more important than bandwidth itself. Indeed consumers
don‟t buy bandwidth for its own sake but to access content and applications.

59. David Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 Research Policy 285 (1986).
60. WILLIAM HENRY CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION: THE NEW IMPERATIVE FOR
CREATING AND PROFITING FROM TECHNOLOGY (Harvard Bus. School Press, 2005).
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Certain users place a high value on streaming video, but the social
value of streaming video compared to other applications, whether emergency communications, government, education, health, or ecommerce,
may be much smaller. Thus we must address the tradeoff between resource-intensive networks serving high private value services versus
modest networks that support socially-valuable services, that may not
be first be the main interest of highest private value users.
Finally we analyze critically emotional arguments in favor of certain telecom policies, that certain things need to be done regardless of
the cost, a technique which is often used to end debate and discussion
about important issues. However if any service is inelastic as advocates
purport, then it is more likely to be provisioned by the market anyway.
Good telecommunication policy is rarely simple. As such we should
resist temptation to make binary interpretations of the world where
more nuanced views can ultimately deliver better social outcomes.

